The Dual-Use Education Gap: Awareness and Education of Life Science Researchers on Nonpathogen-Related Dual-Use Research
Abstract
With the rise of synthetic biology, dual-use research risks are not confined to pathogen-related research. However, existing measures to mitigate the risks of dual-use research, such as export control, are still designed to hinder access to pathogens and do not address the risks of nonpathogen-related dual-use research. The current self-regulatory approach requires scientists to be aware of their responsibility and know how to assess risks and establish countermeasures. The purpose of this study was to examine the state of knowledge about dual-use research among life science students and to test an alternative teaching approach on the importance of considering biosecurity risks for teams participating in the International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition. We conducted an international survey from July 18 to September 13, 2018, which was completed by 192 respondents from 29 countries and 74 universities. Based on the results of the survey, we designed and tested a learning workshop on dual-use research within the iGEM community. Results from the workshop and the survey show that educational machinery so far have failed to integrate teaching about dual-use research issues.
Dual-Use Concerns Exist in Nonpathogen-Related Research
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines dual-use life science research as “knowledge and technologies generated by legitimate life science research that may be appropriated for illegitimate intentions and applications.”1
One of the most obvious examples of dual-use research, and the one oversight focuses on, is research on pathogens. This research is needed to cope with outbreaks and pandemics, but pathogens can also cause severe harm when used by people with malicious intent. To prevent the misuse of pathogen-related research, in most parts of the world countermeasures such as export control and strict laboratory biorisk management are in place. In addition to those measures, sufficient education for researchers on how best to mitigate pathogen-related research risks is also important.2
Dual-use research is defined not only by the particular organisms used in research; certain activities, such as 7 types of risky studies or “experiments of concern,” are also commonly considered to be dual-use research.3 This includes experiments where pathogens are modified to become more transmissible or more virulent,4 such as the experiment performed by Herfst et al5 in 2012, in which his team modified the influenza A (H5N1) virus to gain airborne transmissibility between ferrets.
Frameworks like the 7 experiments of concern primarily focus on animal or agricultural pathogens, but research does not have to involve pathogens to have potential for misuse. Examples of such research include the gene editing-based Insect Allies project,6 whose potential to be used as a bioweapon has been extensively discussed in the past,7 and the potential malicious use of gene drives.8
We became aware of this problem while working on our own project as part of the International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition in 2018. Our team, from the Center for Biotechnology at Bielefeld University (Bielefeld-CeBiTec), aimed to produce metal nanoparticles from waste using Escherichia coli.9 During the course of the project, a team member asked, “What would happen if these ‘metal-eating bacteria’ are used to degrade functional electronics?” At that time, all team members and most of our supervisors had never heard of the term “dual-use research” or knew who to talk to after identifying a potential for misuse of their research project.
If the question of misuse had not been raised by our team, we might never have realized that our project could potentially be used to cause harm. All of the team's organisms, parts, and research activities were suited for a biosafety laboratory level 1, the lowest safety category in Germany. This suggests there was minimal safety risk from the project. The company synthesizing the DNA would not have flagged the orders as potentially hazardous, because none of the sequences were associated with pathogenicity. Additionally, none of the organisms or parts used fall under export control lists, such as the Australia Group Common Control List.10
If the work of researchers is not captured by any of these regulatory regimes, it can be difficult for the researchers to identify and manage dual-use risks. Researchers working with risk group 1 organisms, like E coli laboratory strains, are less likely to have come across or considered dual-use research issues.11 This was the case for our iGEM team, in which none of the students had ever worked with pathogens nor had any training on dual-use research issues. In general, the university relies on the self-initiative of the primary investigator to offer dual-use research training. If these educational gaps had been filled, the researchers could have identified dual-use research risks earlier, during the project planning phase, enabling them to redesign their project to be safer. They would still get the desired research outcome, but in a safer research environment with lower risks.
This approach of dual-use research risk mitigation by the researchers themselves has several advantages; however, many researchers are hesitant to learn more about dual-use research because they fear that regulations are too critical and will result in them having to give up research projects. This impression of biosecurity considerations as a hindrance to free research needs to be met with good practice examples that show, to the contrary, that biosecurity considerations can ease the realization of research projects. For our 2018 iGEM project, a simple change of the substrate from solid metals to soluble metal ions, like those found in mining wastewater, greatly decreased the potential for misuse. By identifying the dual-use research risk in the planning phase and adapting the substrate early in the project, we reduced the dual-use research potential and avoided additional work by not wasting resources on adapting the project at a later stage. Our team also later realized that changes made to manage the dual-use research risks had other benefits, even increasing the feasibility of the project, since the new uptake strategy was easier.
To further understand dual-use research awareness among life science students and researchers worldwide, we decided to use the iGEM community as a case study. The iGEM competition is the largest synthetic biology competition in the world. The competition had 353 teams in 2019, reaching more than 40 countries and over 6,500 participants.12 iGEM has a dedicated biosafety and biosecurity program, and the website of this program offers information on dual-use research.13 In addition, nearly all results are open source. Consequently, anyone with access to the internet has access to all information about the projects. Due to the enormous impact of this access and the fact that teams are forbidden to work with organisms categorized as risk group 3 or 4 (which include the most dangerous pathogens), iGEM offers the ideal environment to study how researchers handle nonpathogen-related dual-use research.
Methods
We conducted an international survey from July 18 to September 13, 2018, which was completed by 192 respondents from 29 countries and 74 universities. The survey was posted online and advertised through the social media channels of the iGEM Bielefeld-CeBiTec team.
Based on the results of the survey, we designed and tested a learning workshop on dual-use research within the iGEM community. Past education projects emphasize the importance of teaching biosecurity issues using active learning approaches like team-based learning, especially given that biosecurity is an unfamiliar topic to life science students.14 To test a continuous approach to establish better awareness for dual-use research issues, we tested the workshop 6 times within and outside of the iGEM community in 2020 and 2021.
The interactive workshop focuses on 2 case studies. In contrast to team-based learning strategies, the workshop was designed to fit within a 2-hour timeframe while still facilitating an active learning approach. The workshop aimed to introduce students to the basic concepts of evaluating and classifying biosafety and biosecurity risks, with a focus on nonpathogen-related dual-use research.
Due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, workshops were held via Zoom. Students were separated into 4 groups with up to 5 students in each group, and 2 groups were assigned to each case study. For each case study, 1 group watched a 3-minute video introduction before beginning, whereas the other group did not. The video contained WHO definitions of dual-use research, biosafety, and biosecurity.1,15 We used this video introduction to determine whether teaching definitions would help students to correctly assess and classify risks.
The 4 groups then learned about their case study in the form of a short presentation. We decided to use ambiguous cases that, depending on the definition used, may or may not be classified as dual-use research. Both case studies were nonpathogen related. The 2 case studies were:
•
The Insect Allies project by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which aimed to use insects to deliver gene therapy that would engineer agriculturally relevant plants.6
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An example gene drive solution to combat Amaranthus palmeri in the southern states of the United States, which was taken from the 2016 National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine report, Gene Drives on the Horizon.16 The aim of the project was to create gene drives that would reduce or eliminate glyphosate-resistant A palmeri on agricultural fields.
The teams had 30 minutes to respond to the following questions:
•
What are the biosafety risks of the project?
•
What are the biosecurity risks of the project?
•
Would you classify the project as a dual-use research project? Why or why not?
Each team then had 3 to 5 minutes to present their results to the group. After the team presentations, workshop facilitators gave a more detailed presentation entitled: “Dual-Use and Dual-Use Research of Concern – Between Science Misuse and Science Communication.” The facilitators then discussed the concept and intended design of the workshop with participants.
We held the dual-use research workshop 5 times as an online event for iGEM participants and once for the life science community as a whole, in cooperation with the Alberta RNA Research and Training Institute and SynBio Canada. Each group had a facilitator who helped keep track of the time and ensured protocols were followed during discussions.
Findings
Lack of Awareness and Desire for More Education
The aim of the initial survey was to determine whether it was an isolated incident that the Bielefeld iGEM team had never heard of dual-use research risks or if the lack of awareness was more widespread. Previous investigations on dual-use research awareness have shown an overall lack of awareness among life scientists; for example, the 2016 Gene Drives on the Horizon report16 states that education on biosecurity issues in the United States is rarely introduced in a systematic way at undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate levels, unless the researcher works with pathogens and even then, the focus is on biosafety. In addition, a survey conducted among postgraduate researchers in Pakistan showed that 58.2% of survey respondents had never heard of the term “dual-use research of concern.”17
In the survey conducted for our study, the first question was whether respondents knew the meaning of the term “dual use” in the context of science. Only 41% (n = 79) knew the meaning of the term in the context of science. Most respondents did not know, and a few chose the wrong definition (Figure 1).
To better understand how students think about biosecurity-related risks, we asked if students were concerned about the potential misuse of research in their discipline. Over half (n = 104, 54%) of respondents agreed they were concerned, while 30% (n = 57) said they were not concerned and 16% (n = 31) had no opinion. This shows that even if students are not aware of the definition of “dual use,” they are concerned about biosecurity risks.
When asked if they thought results from dual-use research should be published and freely accessible, almost two-thirds (n = 117, 61%) of respondents stated that results should be published, with censorship if necessary (Figure 2). This response shows a relatively high degree of comfort with adapting publications because of sensitive research findings, which surprised us since an argument we often heard against increasing awareness of dual-use research was that it might lead to censorship and hinder freedom in research.
We then asked the respondents about their experience with the concept of dual use in their education and training, including how well their university or department teaches or informs students about the topic in their curricula (Figure 3), and in what form of teaching course dual-use issues are taught—choices included lecture, seminar, research project, other, or not at all. Only 16% (n = 31) of the students stated that their department does a good job in including dual-use issues in the curricula, whereas 4% (n = 8) answered “poor.” These results do not seem surprising given the overall lack of knowledge as mentioned earlier. They also align with the responses to the question: “How does your university inform about dual-use and dual-use research of concern?” More than half of the respondents stated that their university does not inform them at all (data shown in the Supplemental Material, available at www.liebertpub.com/doi/suppl/10.1089/hs.2021.0177).
We also wanted to know if the survey respondents were interested in learning more about these topics as part of their university education. The majority (n = 146, 76%) of respondents stated that they want more education about dual-use issues, while the rest had either no opinion (n = 17, 14%) or no interest n = 19, 10%).
In the last question, students were asked if they knew who to contact if they had concerns about the effects of their research and publications; 58% (n = 111) responded “no” and 42% (n = 81) responded “yes.”
The lack of awareness related to dual-use research has long been a problem. In 2011, Minehata et al18 summarized their findings from multiple surveys and concluded that although international attention on dual-use research issues has increased, the lack of awareness among life science students was a severe problem. According to our survey findings, this is still the case. To improve awareness, coordinated international approaches are needed to integrate teaching into life science curricula. We need to design and test new learning opportunities and biosecurity policy concepts to ensure that safety measures grow at the same pace as life science research.14
Dual-Use Research as a Fundamental Part of Science Education
Based on the results of the workshop, we were able to draw some general conclusions that can help to design and improve dual-use research education programs:
Students should consider biosecurity risks that are closely related to their laboratory work and will require support when considering those risks. Nearly all teams participating in the learning workshop focused initially on defining or remembering the difference between biosafety and biosecurity. All teams started with a discussion on biosafety risks closely related to their work in the laboratory, such as unintentional release or mutations arising from their experimental design that could lead to unwanted effects. Their 2 main challenges were (1) classifying risks as biosafety or biosecurity and (2) identifying biosecurity risks. As a result, the students later named the unfamiliarity of biosecurity risks. After the discussions and presentations, the students said that the process of discussing the mistakes in their evaluation as a group increased their confidence in being able to better identify dual-use research.
If questions are well structured, providing definitions may be counterproductive. All teams working on the Insect Allies case study classified the project as dual-use research and most team presentations mentioned its potential to be used as a bioweapon. For the A palmeri case study, the teams had different opinions about whether to classify it as dual-use research. The team that had not been taught the definitions did not classify the project as dual-use research, arguing that the technology of using gene drives harbors the potential to cause harm, but that the specific project of gene drives in A palmeri did not fulfill the criteria of potential for direct misuse.
The teams that received the introduction with definitions did not identify more risks or better classify the risks as biosafety or biosecurity related. According to the facilitators, the teams that did not receive an introduction with definitions had gained a better understanding of the terms “biosafety,” “biosecurity,” and “dual-use research.” During the discussions, teams that received an introduction to the definitions said the video was useful, especially in realizing the difference between biosafety and biosecurity. However, the teams without the definitions knew there was a difference because of the way the questions were formulated, which led quickly to a discussion within the group about what those differences might be. This approach may have led to a better understanding of the concepts, because those students took a deeper look at the definitions.
Ultimately, we want students to assess whether their project could cause harm. To achieve this goal, teaching definitions could be counterproductive since risks might be overlooked with the justification that the risks do not closely match one of the existing definitions.
Active learning approaches work better than presenting definitions. If students must come up with risks and definitions themselves, they take a deeper look into these risks, which leads to better understanding of the general matter even if the definitions might not be entirely correct. Allowing our workshop participants to work on case studies first and then evaluate their work as a group ensured they had the best understanding of the topic. Although we believe that courses based on active learning work better in person, the online format enabled students from around the world to work together on projects, which generated discussions of regional attitudes and approaches to dual-use research risk reduction and education.
Students recognize gaps in their education related to biosecurity and would like to learn more. In the discussion after the workshop presentations, the students stated that none of them had learned about the difference between biosafety and biosecurity during their university education; in fact, some languages translate both terms into the same word, which had led to misunderstandings. All of the students in the workshops said they wished to learn about biosecurity risks in their university education, which mirrors the results from our survey. None of the students had ever attended a lecture or seminar covering these issues. They also told us that “beyond the lab” they learn only about ethical issues and biosafety as far as it concerns laboratory safety. All of the students also said they had underestimated the importance of considering biosecurity issues and were unfamiliar with the case studies, even though the Insect Allies project had been widely discussed in the biosecurity community.7,19,20
Considering dual-use risks early in the project facilitates the research process and prevents wasting resources. For the A palmeri case study, we suggested 2 possible targets for a gene drive: a glyphosate-resistant enzyme or sex-specific genes that would cause the entire population to collapse. As the students discussed risks related to these 2 research approaches, they quickly realized that even if both approaches followed the same aim, the second approach had a higher potential to be misused. Considering dual-use research risks early in the project planning phase enables the researchers to implement mitigation measures, preventing wasting time and materials on research that is not sufficient for implementation.
Only a fraction of the students showed enough interest in biosecurity to attend a voluntary course. Workshop participation was voluntary, but contrary to the findings of the survey, in which 76% (n = 146) of the respondents stated they want to learn more about dual-use research, about 45 iGEM 2021 participants attended one of the workshops, which is less than 1% of the 7,314 iGEM 2021 participants.21
The absence of mandatory dual-use research education conveys the impression that biosecurity considerations are not a fundamental part of life science education.14,22 Several organizations have made biosecurity-related teaching material available online, but they still rely on the self-initiative of teachers to incorporate these materials into their courses. The state of biosecurity knowledge suggests that this approach is not sufficient, perhaps because teachers, like their students, are not aware of biosecurity risks or because they do not consider biosecurity risks important enough to integrate into curricula. As a result, students have the impression that biosecurity is not as important as other topics taught in their courses and, therefore, not an integral part of their research. In addition, teaching programs mainly include examples of pathogen-related dual-use research, conveying the impression that nonpathogen-related research has no relevance to biosecurity.
Implications for iGEM and the Life Science Research Community
The data from the survey and the workshop show that most life science students have never heard of dual-use research and that the educational machinery so far has failed to integrate teaching about dual-use research issues into life science curricula. We should note that the survey data are from 2018, and that the COVID-19 pandemic and teaching approaches conducted since 2018 may have increased awareness on dual-use research. Nonetheless, this study identifies key problems and presents education approaches regarding nonpathogen dual-use research within the iGEM community that can be applied to the entire life science community.
The key findings from this study are:
•
Dual-use research issues exist in nonpathogen-related research, but existing oversight frameworks primarily focus on pathogen-related dual-use research.
•
Enabling researchers to identify dual-use research risks early in the planning stage allows them to revise the experimental design, both reducing risk of misuse and preventing wasted resources.
•
Too few life science researchers understand the meaning of dual-use research.
•
The majority (n = 146, 76%) of survey respondents stated they wanted more education on dual-use research issues.
•
Education on dual-use research issues needs to be widespread to convey the importance of considering dual-use research risks as a fundamental part of research.
•
Nonpathogen-related dual-use research examples need to be included in existing and future learning opportunities.
The main implication of these findings for iGEM is that it needs to decide whether to have a stronger focus on teaching biosecurity issues. iGEM is able to quickly test and implement new educational projects and has the big advantage of a designated safety and security program.23 Participants already have an obligation to assess safety and security risks related to their projects, but some projects still present challenges to the existing safety and security program, including nonpathogen-related dual-use research.24 The workshop might improve understanding and consideration of dual-use research issues among teams, but it is not realistic to think that workshops at the regional meetup would be able to reach every iGEM team. To gain wider reach, educational programs should be implemented on a larger scale and earlier in the iGEM season, when teams are beginning to plan their projects.
Beyond iGEM, implementing suitable educational programs about dual-use research in the larger life science community will be more difficult, because more actors need to be involved and more time and money will be needed to change a whole educational machinery. The first step is to integrate not only examples of pathogen-related research but also nonpathogen-related dual-use research into existing learning opportunities such as FutureLearn's “Next Generation Biosecurity: Responding to 21st Century Biorisks” online course by the University of Bath and Biosecure22 or in teaching materials such as the Biological Security Education Handbook: The Power of Team-Based Learning.14 The second step is to ensure that these teaching opportunities reach the students.
The results of this study show that it is not enough to publish teaching materials and rely on the self-initiative of universities to implement them. A biosecurity outreach campaign is needed to convince all actors to implement teaching about risks. In addition, more actors need to be involved, including future employers and the life science research industry. If future employers do not value students with additional qualifications in biosecurity, students have less incentive to participate in workshops and other learning opportunities.
An alternative to voluntary learning based on incentives would be a compulsory dual-use research education. The advantage of compulsory learning is that students would understand that biosecurity considerations are a fundamental part of life science research. For this approach to be successful, the basics of biosecurity must be discussed in at least 1 lecture of every life science study curriculum. If lecturers do not see the necessity of integrating biosecurity issues in the curriculum, it might be worth inviting guest lecturers who have experience with biosecurity policy. It is important to note that universities cannot be forced to implement mandatory biosecurity education. To facilitate this approach, an open dialogue is needed between universities and biosecurity policymakers to ensure that universities understand why such an approach is beneficial and which frameworks are needed to support implementation.
A mandatory teaching approach that covers only the basic concepts of dual-use research has the advantage of requiring minimal time invested. For students who want to learn more about dual-use research issues, additional voluntary learning opportunities could be offered. It should be noted that several aspects of responsible research, such as broader ethical guidelines, are underrepresented in teaching curricula.25 Combining various aspects of responsible life science research into a single study course through, for example, guest lectures on responsible science, ethics, and biosecurity like those offered by the Centre for Biosecurity and Biopreparedness, could therefore be useful.26
International organizations involved in life science education, networking, and biological threat reduction can play an important role in supporting and building up educational networks. As previously mentioned, some organizations have already started to offer teaching materials or workshops and/or are aware of the importance of raising awareness; for example, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) future priorities from 2018 stated that “public engagement, education, and awareness-raising must become an integral part of OPCW activities.”27
Conclusion
Overall, our findings from the survey and workshops conducted within the iGEM community show that more opportunities for learning are needed to bridge the dual-use education gap among life science researchers, but that increasing dual-use research awareness on a broader scale is still within reach. In the past, implementing new biosecurity learning opportunities had not been a priority. To correct this oversight, we need to incorporate teaching about nonpathogen-related dual-use research. Current regulation strategies for dual-use research rely almost entirely on self-regulation, and thus their awareness. All actors including biosecurity policymakers, teachers, and industry need to work together and invest time and resources to create educational programs that ensure life science research is conducted in a safe and responsible way. Doing so will prevent future researchers from being unaware of dual-use research risks that have the potential to cause widespread harm.
Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Tessa Alexanian, co-chair of the iGEM Safety and Security Committee, for reviewing the draft and providing administrative support for the workshops. We want to thank Levin Joe Klages and Matthias Otto for their support as workshop facilitators and the entire Bielefeld-CeBiTec 2018 iGEM team for their engagement in raising dual-use awareness, which initiated this study.
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References
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© Svenja Vinke, et al., 2022; Published by Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.
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This Open Access article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited.
History
Published online: 15 February 2022
Published in print: January/February 2022
Accepted: 4 January 2022
Revision received: 2 January 2022
Received: 7 October 2021
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